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{Criminology}

Why rape

should not (always) be a crime

forthcoming in Minnesota Law Review
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Katharine K. Baker
Professor of Law
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K

atharine Baker received her law degree (with honors) from the University of Chicago
Law School, where she was a comments editor for the University of Chicago Law
Review. After graduating, she clerked for the Honorable Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. From 1990 to 1993, she was a trial attorney with the
Environmental Enforcement Section of the United States Department of Justice.
Most of Professor Baker’s work focuses on issues pertaining to women. She has written extensively about sexual violence, in particular about the legal and social understandings of rape
and sex. In recent years, she has focused more on family law issues, writing numerous articles
on the interrelationships between legal, cultural, and biological constructions of parenthood,
marriage, and family.
Professor Baker has taught courses in environmental law, evidence, property, family law,
gender, sexual orientation, and domestic violence. From 2001 to 2009, she was Associate Dean
for Faculty Development. She has been a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, Yale Law School, and Northwestern Law School.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/kbaker.
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Why Rape
Should Not (Always) Be a Crime
By Katharine K. Baker

S

houldn’t rape, an act of bodily invasion that can traumatize, endanger, and dehumanize its victims, be punished as crime? For centuries, lawmakers, philosophers,
legal theorists and women’s rights advocates have converged
upon the criminal law as the appropriate vehicle to reflect society’s opprobrium and inculcate norms against rape. This may be
changing. In response to a broad and comprehensive enforcement effort by the Department of Education (DOE), many
universities are re-drafting their campus sexual assault policies
so that sexual assault is treated as a form of sex discrimination.
Notwithstanding 20 centuries of treating rape as a criminal injury, DOE has recast rape as a civil wrong—a discriminatory
act. This article argues that by invoking a civil process, DOE
is likely to meet with more success than the criminal law in reducing the amount of nonconsensual sex. Once it does so, the
norm of male entitlement that gives rise to so much criminal
conduct may be destabilized enough to enable the criminal law
as reformed to be enforced.
The story of criminal rape law’s undoing begins with the rape
reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which attempted
A summary of Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, ___ Minnesota Law Review ___
(forthcoming).
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to have the criminal law take rape more
seriously. The individual goals of different
state rape reform movements were many
and tactics varied, but one overriding
goal, shared by virtually all reformers,
was to expand the amount of criminally
proscribed activity. Traditional rape law
reflected a social norm that validated
men’s entitlement to sex and allowed
men to consistently ignore and override
women’s will. By refusing to criminalize
sexual activity coerced without force, and
often perpetrated by men that women
knew, the law sanctioned men’s routine
appropriation of sex from women. The
goal of rape reform was to make women’s
willingness to have sex—her consent—
the centerpiece of the rape inquiry so that
men would no longer feel so entitled to
disregard a woman’s will in their attempt
to get as much sex as they wanted. Because the male entitlement norm has not
shifted sufficiently, DOE must now use a
civil cause of action to combat what had
been seen as a criminal problem.

T

his article advances three overlapping
but different reasons for why the
criminal law has not been more successful
in changing the social norms with regard
to male entitlement to sex. First, the criminal burden of proof makes norm transformation exceedingly difficult. Making
consent the determinative factor in rape
does little good if proving the absence
thereof—beyond a reasonable doubt, no
less—is all but impossible. A law that defines rape as nonconsensual sex may get
the theory of rape right, but it ignores the
overwhelming practical difficulty of proving non-consent in a context in which
it is perfectly plausible to think that the
act was consensual. This problem applies
to a huge amount of sexual misconduct,
whether secured through force or not.
Victim credibility is crucial in the vast
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majority of rape cases, but the circumstances in which rapes occur and the sexual nature of the crime make it likely that
victims will be a bad witnesses. Most acquaintance rapes involve people who have
been drinking alcohol; thus their memories are likely to be fuzzy. Even without
alcohol, rape victims tend to have fuzzier
memories than victims of other types of
traumatic or unpleasant experiences. Indeed, blocking out the event from one’s
memory has been found to be a healthy
psychological response. It helps diminish
the ongoing trauma that rape victims
suffer. In other words, the healthier the
victim, the worse she is as a witness.
This problem of having to rely so
completely on the victim’s credibility has
nothing to do with police or prosecutors
not believing in the harms of acquaintance. It has little to do with women as a
class not being believed. The problem is a
crime that by its nature has no witnesses,
produces no demonstrable evidence, and
inevitably brings with it a perfectly plausible theory of legality, i.e., consent. The
crime also involves, indeed the essence of
the injury stems from, an act that most
people find very difficult to talk about.
If no behavior is punished criminally because it cannot be proved, then the public’s understanding of criminal behavior
will not change.
Second, competing constructions of
“the rapist” undermined feminist attempts
to de-normalize male predatory behavior.
Tough-on-rapist measures enacted in the
1990s reflect an understanding of rapists as profoundly deviant and distinctly
criminal. This pathological view of rape
rejects the feminist insight at the core of
much rape reform, which was that male
appropriation of sex is commonplace and
completely understandable given heterosexual scripts and norms of sexual pursuit.
Rape reformers knew this. They

Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime

knew that they were trying to unpack entrenched norms in gendered scripts that
all too easily explained why acquaintance
rape was so prevalent. They knew that
they were indicting the status quo and
trying to make it criminal. But even as
these reformers were analyzing the likely
problems with making the commonplace
criminal, there was a competing, though
superficially sympathetic, movement which
sought to re-invigorate the notion that
rapists—real rapists—were particularly

injury, victims’ agency, and the criminal
law. In an effort to combat social norms
that divested women of sexual agency,
rape reform efforts asked all parties—victim, potential perpetrator, and jurors—to
assume women lack agency; but women
often resist being viewed this way. Raised
to believe they have sexual agency even if
research continues to confirm that they
do not usually exercise it, young women
today would rather see their failure to
resist as an affirmative act that resulted in

“The criminal burden of proof makes norm
transformation exceedingly difficult. Making consent
the determinative factor in rape does little good if
proving the absence thereof is all but impossible.”
dangerous. The result was a series of toughon-rapists initiatives—including registration
and notification systems for convicted
rapists, and both civil commitment rules
and special evidence rules allowing prior
act evidence in rape trials. In passing these
rules Congress relied on demonstrably
false stereotypes of rapists as uniquely
pathological and distinctly recidivistic.
It is surprising is how little resistance
the tough-on-rapist movement encountered from feminists. It took less than 20
years for most state legislatures first to
override the traditional approach to rape
in order to greatly expand the class of offenses that might be criminalized as sexual
assault, and second to institute unique
forms of punishment that inevitably
restricted the number of men whom the
criminal justice system would be willing
to classify as rapists. No one commented
on the whiplash.
Third, rape reformers failed to appreciate the delicate relationship between rape’s

unwanted sex than see his failure to stop
as the affirmative act that resulted in rape.
Moreover, when rape is a crime against
the state, enforcement of it necessarily
inhibits a victim’s agency because the enforcement power and decision-making is
vested in someone other than the victim.
While this is true of all personal injury
crimes, it is a particular problem with
rape law if the essence of the injury is an
affront to a victim’s autonomy and agency.
Enforcing the crime thus tends to accentuate rather than alleviate the injury to
agency, and women consistently refuse to
label their own experiences as rape, even if
the criminal law would seem to.
Women also repeatedly refuse to
blame men. Victims are often uncomfortable labeling the men who were negligent, recklessly indifferent with regard to
consent, or even a bit forceful as rapists.
Champions of the force requirement
might use women’s reluctance to blame
men as proof that rape requires force.
Spring 2015 [ 5 ]
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As a theoretical matter, that reasoning is
tautological, but as a practical matter, it is
irrefutable. Women’s reluctance to blame
men for rape comes from the lingering
cultural confusion over what rape is. If everyone came to view the traditional sexual
scripts as pernicious and outdated, like
the rule of thumb for domestic violence,
it would be much easier to blame men for
proceeding without consent. As a practical matter, however, the power to expand
the scope of behavior that can be defined
as rape is inevitably in the hands of victims. If they believe in male entitlement,
they will not be willing to punish the men
who are just pursuing that to which they
are entitled. DOE is policing predatory
behavior, fostered by a norm of sexual
entitlement, that disregards women’s will.

people are still not ready to call most men
who secure sex without consent “rapists,”
DOE and universities must be careful not
to allow people to conflate what DOE is
■
prohibiting with rape. 

R

Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families:
The Standardization of Family Law When There
Is No Standard Family, 2012 University of Illinois
Law Review 319 (2012).

esistance to the new policies to date
has come mostly from those unwilling to see university procedures as distinct
from the criminal law. Thus, critics either
insist that the problem be addressed in
the criminal system, or they insist that
universities provide criminal law safeguards for those accused. But the offense
that many men on college campuses are
being accused of is not rape. It is discriminatory conduct. If found responsible for
such conduct, the men should not be
considered rapists. Indeed, because most
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Family Law: The Essentials (Aspen Publishers
2009) (with K. Silbaugh).

Articles
Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, ___
Boston College Law Review ___ (forthcoming).
Sex and Equality, 93 Boston University Law Review Annex 11 (2013) (symposium).

Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights:
The Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family Status
from Family Rights, 71 Ohio State Law Journal
127 (2010).
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 Georgia Law Review 649 (2008).
A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 University of
Chicago Law Review 599 (2005) (with I. Ayres).
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Women & Justice
for the poor
A History Of Legal Aid

published by Cambridge University Press
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F

elice Batlan is both subject and scholar in the field of women’s legal history. Her nine
years of practical legal experience supplement her rigorous academic career, in which she
has published and presented extensively on the topics of legal history, women in the legal profession, and feminist legal theory—occasionally appearing alongside such prominent feminist
figures as Gloria Steinem. She is the author of Women and Justice for the Poor: A History
of Legal Aid, 1863–1945, just published by Cambridge University Press.
After law school, Professor Batlan clerked for the Honorable Constance Baker Motley
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and then worked as a law
firm associate specializing in securities law and financial markets. She then joined Greenwich
NatWest as associate general counsel and head of global compliance. Eventually she returned
to the academic world, completing a Ph.D. in U.S. history from New York University.
Professor Batlan has immersed herself in a wide variety of subjects spanning law, financial
regulation, and the humanities, serving as both director of the Institute for Compliance and
co-director of the Institute for Law and the Humanities. Her teaching areas include U.S. legal
history, gender and the law, feminist jurisprudence, corporations, business organizations, securities regulation, and contracts. She has taught courses internationally in Sienna, Paris, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, and Bangkok. She received Chicago-Kent’s Excellence in Teaching
Award in 2009 and IIT’s Julia Beveridge Award for service to women students in 2008.
Professor Batlan is an associate editor and book review editor for the prestigious Law and
History Review. Previously she has performed editorial duties for Continuity and Change,
and for the Macmillan-Gale Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States. As
a historian, she has served as both a consultant and a member of the Accession Committee for
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/fbatlan.
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Women & Justice
for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid
By Felice Batlan

T

his book began in New Orleans amid the debris
and destruction of Hurricane Katrina. In 2005, when
the storm struck, I was living in New Orleans and
teaching at Tulane University. The weeks after the storm were
a confusing jumble of friends’ couches, searches for clothing, and a growing sense that this would not end soon. Doing something in New Orleans seemed better than passively
watching the continuing disaster on CNN, so I moved back
into my damaged but still standing home. As someone living
in New Orleans when much of the city was unoccupied and
in ruins, I received constant calls from acquaintances, friends,
and friends of friends who were unable to return to the city.
People needed help with insurance forms and mortgages, with
locating relatives, procuring housing, finding documents, and,
above all else, dealing with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its arbitrary and changing policies
and procedures. In the wake of such an enormous catastrophe
and the haphazard response by the government, many people
needed a witness and advocate on the ground.
FEMA established a series of disaster recovery centers in

A excerpt from Women and Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid, 1863–1945 (Cambridge
University Press 2015).
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and around New Orleans that were intended to function as “supermarkets” for
hurricane aid. In these centers, victims
could apply for FEMA benefits; procure
information on repairing a roof; speak
to the Army Corps of Engineers; receive
a disaster tax rebate; find a Bible, a hot
meal, a friendly ear. In theory, the centers
were an excellent idea; in practice, they
resulted in hundreds of people waiting in
long lines for hour after hour. One day I
approached a FEMA manager, handed her
my resume, and asked if I could set up a
legal-information booth. She allowed me

representatives and people applying for
benefits, and tried to understand how
FEMA was interpreting its ever-changing
rules. I informed inexperienced FEMA
workers what the agency’s policies were on
that day, and alerted FEMA employees,
all working in the same room, that they
were interpreting policy in diametrically
opposed ways. Most of all, I listened to
people’s stories, as the storm produced
as many stories as there were survivors.
Narrating their stories seemed crucial to
those who were trying to process events
that had happened so quickly.

“Women and Justice for the Poor uncovers the
enormous role played by women as legal aid
providers and explores how ideologies of gender
shaped legal aid.”
to do so without asking a single question.
The “booth” consisted of a folding table
and my cell phone. I organized a handful
of attorney friends, and we staffed our
station six days a week for two months.
I noticed that of the thousands of
people who stopped by, few needed anything that I understood to be legal advice.
A series of complicated emergency rules
temporarily allowed volunteer attorneys
like myself to practice law. Yet I had no
clear understanding of whether I was covered by those rules or for whom I worked.
Nor did I have the resources or expertise
to practice law in any traditional sense.
Instead, I functioned as a sort of mediator, personal advocate, legal educator, and
social worker.
People came to our booth because
they were desperately frustrated and
needed help in whatever form it would
come. Often I mediated between FEMA
[ 10 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

This work made me reflect on what
I was doing and whether I was using my
legal knowledge, legal skill, or anything
else that I had learned in law school or
during my decade as a legal practitioner.
In the FEMA center, law and social work
bled together. My work seemed similar to
that performed by many women’s organizations in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. My legal-assistance
project made me reflect broadly on volunteer work, charity, lawyers, social workers,
and the ambiguities of what the practice
of law means in an environment of massive and aching need.

T

he development of organized free
legal aid for the poor in the United
States has a rich history that has been
overlooked, even buried. Women and
Justice for the Poor uncovers the enormous
role played by women as legal aid provid-

Women and Justice for the Poor

ers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It explores how ideologies
of gender shaped and constructed what
legal aid was and who would be its providers and clients. The book exposes the
“real” history of legal aid, a story that the
predominantly male leaders in the field of
legal aid intentionally masked.
During the late nineteenth century
women’s organizations pioneered the
provision of legal aid in major cities such
as New York, Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Although the actual everyday delivery of such aid was carried out primarily
by upper- and middle-class women who
were not professional lawyers, their work
eventually created a female and feminized
“dominion” of legal aid. These early organizations specialized in claims on behalf
of poor women—first addressing mostly
wage claims against employers and then
expanding to domestic relations cases and
other legal problems. Such organizations
defined legal assistance broadly, to include
“The Waiting-Room in the Building of the Workingwoman’s
Protective Union,” illustration by Georgina A. Davis. From
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Feb. 5, 1881. Courtesy
of Felice Batlan.

multiple kinds of advice as well as the provision of material aid. They also situated
legal assistance within a wider agenda that
included equality for women in the workplace, the home, and the public sphere.
As practiced by women’s organizations,
the provision of legal aid intentionally
entailed the legal equivalent of a laying
on of hands. That is, the connections and
interactions between poor women and
women lay lawyers, they believed, helped
heal class rifts, and they took place in an
environment in which poor women could
freely tell their stories. With time and experience, women lay lawyers acquired legal knowledge and positioned themselves
as experts in the law, a stance that some
male lawyers, and judges, accepted and
even respected.
Following the creation of women’s legal aid organizations, a second generation
of legal aid associations developed in the
late nineteenth and the early twentieth
century. These societies generally were
controlled by professional male lawyers,
Spring 2015 [ 11 ]
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and they provided legal assistance to both
men and women. As a number of male
legal aid lawyers gained prominence, they
sought to professionalize legal aid and
transform it from its status as a charity—
with its female dominion of lay lawyers—
to something more akin to the private
practice of law.
These new legal aid leaders redrew
the conventional image of the legal aid
client; rather than a poor woman with a
domestic relations claim, the client was
now a working man with a wage claim.
Such manly clients were entitled to legal
aid as a means to establish their independence. Many clients of second-generation
legal aid societies were immigrants, and
attorneys imagined that the provision of
legal assistance to these men served as a
lesson in citizenship. This process of reconfiguring legal aid obscured women’s
presence as clients, lay lawyers, and even
professional lawyers. Moreover, new legal aid organizations began to reject the
types of claims, especially those involving
domestic relations, that women typically
sought to bring.
By the early 1920s, male leaders in legal aid panicked over issues of gender, authority, expertise, and professionalization.
The resulting controversy raised questions
about what constituted the practice law,
what the rule of law meant, what was a
legal problem, what types of services legal aid should provide, and which clients
legal aid should serve. Central to these
issues was a fundamental question: Was
legal aid meant to offer a process-based
form of justice by allowing access to an
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attorney, or was it intended to create substantive justice? Although scholars of legal
aid have long pointed to its conservative
nature, lay lawyers presented an alternative, more expansive version of legal aid
■
based on ideas of social justice. 
Felice Batlan
Selected Publications
Articles and Contributions to Books
Legal Aid, Women Lay Lawyers, and the Rewriting of History, 1863–1930, in Feminist Legal History: Essays on Women and Law (T. Thomas & T.
Boisseau eds., NYU Press 2011).
“If You Become His Second Wife, You Are a
Fool”: Shifting Paradigms of the Roles, Perceptions, and Working Conditions of Legal Secretaries in Large Law Firms, 52 Studies in Law, Politics
and Society 169 (2010).
The Birth of Legal Aid: Gender Ideologies, Women, and the Bar in New York City, 1863–1910,
28 Law and History Review 931 (2010).
Not Our Mother’s Law School?: A Third-Wave
Feminist Study of Women’s Experiences in Law
School, 39 University of Baltimore Law Forum
124 (2009) (with K. Hradsky, K. Jeschke, L.
Meyer & J. Roberts).
The Ladies Health Protective Association: Lay
Lawyers and Urban Cause Lawyering, 41 Akron
Law Review 701 (2008).
Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power,
and Quarantine Past and Future, 80 Temple Law
Review 53 (2007).
Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: Settlement
Houses, Sociological Jurisprudence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 235 (2006).
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Modifying the military justice system
to better handle
sexual assault cases

published in Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society, volume 29
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ichael Spak served on active duty with the U.S. Army in the Judge Advocate General’s
Corps from 1963 to 1969 and has remained in the U.S. Army Reserves. As Colonel
Spak, he is currently liaison officer of the Judge Advocate General’s School, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for a seven-state area.
Professor Spak joined IIT Chicago-Kent as a professor in 1974. He has also taught at
DePaul University, St. Louis University, and the University of Maryland. At Chicago-Kent,
he teaches courses in the commercial law area.
Professor Spak is the author of numerous books, including Cases and Materials on
Military Justice, as well as more than four dozen law review articles. He has been professorreporter on the Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Illinois Judicial Conference, and other
publications. For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/mspak.

J

onathan P. Tomes is president of Veterans Press, Inc., and
EMR Legal, Inc., a nationwide HIPAA consulting firm based
in Kansas City, and is a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S.
Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He was a visiting professor at IIT Chicago-Kent from 1988 to 1994.
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Practical Problems
with Modifying the Military Justice System
to Better Handle Sexual Assault Cases
By Michael I. Spak and Jonathan P. Tomes

P

rofessor Michael I. Spak and Jonathan P. Tomes
have written extensively on the issue of whether the
military justice system can properly handle sexual harassment and other sex offenses by servicemembers against
other servicemembers, even before the current uproar occasioned by the rise in sexual assaults in recent years and proposed legislation by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y., which
would remove commanders from the decision-making process
in such prosecutions. Professor Spak, a retired colonel in the
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, believes that we
should eliminate the entire military justice system, with the
exception of relatively minor, purely military offenses. His position is as follows: (1) simply abolish the entire “convening
authority” military justice system, with its inherent conflicts of
interests, replacing it with whatever civilian jurisdictions would
otherwise attach, but (2) keep the military system for minor,
purely military offenses. Attorney Jonathan P. Tomes, a retired
lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s
Corps and former infantry and military intelligence officer
who has served in combat, does not have quite such a radical
A summary of Practical Problems with Modifying the Military Justice System to Better Handle
Sexual Assault Cases, 29 Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 377 (2015).
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view, but agrees that problems exist in
the system, particularly in the area of sex
crimes.
Politicians and military members have
been very vocal in espousing their views
on this matter, but what is conspicuously
absent is a thorough discussion of the
necessity for and the practical problems
inherent in either turning all prosecutions
for sex crimes over to civilian authorities
or removing the commander from the
decision-making process altogether—as
suggested by Senator Gillibrand’s legislation, which would remove commanders
from the process of deciding whether serious crimes, including sexual misconduct
cases, go to trial. Under her proposed legislation, that judgment would rest instead
with seasoned trial lawyers who have prosecutorial experience and hold the rank of
colonel or above. Her bill also would take
away a commander’s authority to convene
a court-martial. That responsibility would
be given to a new and separate office outside the victim’s chain of command.
Sounds good, right? Statistics certainly document an increase in military sex
crimes recently, but they also document
increases in suicides and post-traumatic
stress disorder cases likely due to the increased combat rotations of “overseas contingency operations.” Nor do we have a
good handle on the percentage of civilian
sexual assaults that are actually reported,
prosecuted, result in convictions, and
result in incarceration of the offender. It
would not be surprising if the military
had a higher conviction and incarceration
rate than civilian jurisdictions.
Further, practical problems exist,
not all of which favor the servicemember
accused of some form of sexual assault.
Some courts-martial protections protect
the victim. For example, does Military
Rule of Evidence 412, the military’s version of the Rape-Shield Law, afford more
[ 16 ] IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Perspectives

protection than a state’s or the federal
government’s version? And which would
prevail in a state court trial?
The potential problems exist in jurisdictional issues, substantive law and procedural issues, rights of accused servicemembers and alleged victims, and practical/
economic areas.

“Can the military justice
system properly handle
sexual harassment and
other sex offenses by servicemembers against other
servicemembers?”

W

ith regard to jurisdiction, courtsmartial have jurisdiction over all
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) worldwide and many
U.S. civilian crimes as well, by virtue of
Article 134, UCMJ, which uses the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, to make
civilian crimes military offenses. What
happens if we remove court-martial jurisdiction from military sex crimes? Who has
jurisdiction? The jurisdiction of the situs
of the crime? Kansas, if the sex crime occurred at Fort Riley, Kansas? Korea, if the
crime occurred on Osan Air Force Base?
God knows who if the crime occurred in
Somalia or a Taliban-controlled area of
Afghanistan? Some federal court created
to handle such extra-territorial sex crime
offenses? Note that many federal laws do
not have extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Such a change in court-martial jurisdiction would require re-negotiation
of Status of Forces Agreements, which,
among others, specify whether the host
nation or the visiting nation (in this case,
the United States) has jurisdiction over an

Practial Problems with Modifying the Military Justice System

offense. Typically, such agreements provide that the host country has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses that violate the
host nation’s laws, but not those of the
visiting nation. The visiting nation has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses that
violate its laws but not those of the host
nation. It does not, for example, violate
Korean law for a U.S. airman to go absent
without leave (“AWOL”). Both nations
have concurrent jurisdiction when the
offense violates the laws of both countries, with the country that the victim is
a national of having primary concurrent
jurisdiction.
Even within the United States, jurisdictional problems exist. Military bases,
like other federal lands, have three types
of jurisdiction: exclusive, concurrent, and
proprietary use. The latter is where the
federal government has no jurisdiction—
it all resides in the state in which the base
is located. Unless the federal government
cedes exclusive jurisdiction over military
sex crimes and the state accepts it, the state
has no jurisdiction. And why would a state
want jurisdiction over military sex crimes
committed on a military installation?
As to the procedural problems, in
such cases, what law applies? Is an Italian
court going to apply the UCMJ and its
protections for accused servicemembers?
Is a French court going to apply the
military’s definition of sexual harassment? Even though the UCMJ does not
provide for jury trials, it does have a military equivalent in a court composed of
members. How is this right afforded in
a civil law trial presided over by a panel
of judges? Will the UCMJ’s right to free
counsel be eviscerated by a civilian trial?
And what is the protection for the victim
if the trial is held in Afghanistan and its
Sharia law requires four eyewitnesses to
convict someone of rape? And is the victim exempt from being stoned to death

for adultery if the rapist is acquitted?
With regard to practical and economic problems, amending the jurisdiction of
the federal courts by empowering them to
prosecute military sexual assaults may be
the answer. But amending federal court
jurisdiction and the UCMJ may be impossible in this bitterly divided Congress.
Who is going to fund these prosecutions? In one case that one of the authors
is familiar with, the travel costs to bring
witnesses from all over the world where
they had been reassigned was approximately $100,000. Further, the military
does not have to pay its expert witness
military physicians expert witness fees or
fly them first class, but a state or federal
court may have to.
What about bail? Military law does
not have a right to bail. Rather, the
military judge or magistrate determines
whether the accused is a flight risk or a
threat and whether a lesser form of restraint than pretrial confinement, such as
arrest in quarters or restriction to specified
limits, would suffice. But a civilian court
may grant bail, which would, even despite
restrictions—such as no contact with the
victim or witnesses—free up the alleged
offender to threaten or harm the victim or
witnesses or commit other crimes.
Further, military courts-martial have
much stricter speedy trial rules than do
civilian courts. Are victims going to be
pleased with their cases being dragged
out for months or years as opposed to the
six months or less of the vast majority of
courts-martial?
Also, where are convicted military
sex offenders going to be confined? The
military’s prisons, such as the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), or federal or
state prisons? And who is going to fund
civilian prisons, which may already be
overcrowded and underfunded? No military prisoners have yet been released from
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the USDB, for example, as a result of a
judge’s order because of overcrowding.
And the foregoing does not even take
into account the law of unintended consequences. For example, for all we know,
victims will be even less willing to report
sex crimes knowing that their case will be
dragged through a civilian system.
None of the above discussion is intended to place insurmountable barriers
to addressing this problem. But what no
one needs, least of all the victims of such
crimes, is a knee-jerk reaction that does
not thoroughly consider how to address
these practical problems and whether civilian courts will actually be a better way
■
to try these cases.
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The ConservativeLibertarian Turn
in First Amendment Jurisprudence
By Steven J. Heyman

I

n recent years, a conservative majority of the Supreme
Court has issued a raft of decisions that have cheered the
right and dismayed the left. To name only a few cases,
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) declared that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to own firearms.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n (2010) and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n (2014) struck down key
limitations on the ability of corporations and wealthy individuals to dominate the political process. And Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby (2014) held that, under the quasi-constitutional Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, family-owned corporations have a right to religious liberty which permits them to
deny contraceptive coverage to their female employees.
Decisions like these clearly align with the political attitudes
of the justices. But I believe that these decisions also can be understood to reflect a deeper political and constitutional theory.
To see this point, it is important to recognize that the conservative view of the Constitution is not monolithic, but includes
two different strands. The first strand is a traditional conservative

A summary of The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117
West Virginia Law Review 231 (2014), a revised and expanded version of the Third Annual C.
Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy, presented by the author at West
Virginia University College of Law in April 2014.

Spring 2015 [ 21 ]

Steven J. Heyman

position which supports the government’s
authority to enforce law and order and
to promote traditional moral and social
values. This strand can be seen in recent
decisions in which the Court has made it
more difficult to sue the government and
its officials, restricted the rights of criminal defendants, limited the constitutional
right to privacy, and lowered the wall of
separation between church and state.
In contrast, the second strand of conservative constitutionalism is a libertarian position which emphasizes the need
to protect individual freedom against
government regulation. This position is
rooted in a conception of the person as a
separate and independent individual who
is entitled to pursue his own aims so long
as he does not injure others. Society is an
aggregation of individuals, and the state is
a necessary evil—an external force that is
needed to protect individuals against one
another, but which itself poses a serious
threat to freedom. The Constitution is
designed to protect the negative liberty
of individuals against invasion by the
government. It is this libertarian strand
of conservative thought that accounts
for the decisions on gun ownership,
campaign spending, and religious liberty
that I mentioned above. This strand also
underlies other recent decisions that expand protection for property rights, cut
back on affirmative action, and impose
limits on the welfare state and the power
of the federal government—most notably
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), in which the five
conservative justices ruled that Congress
had no power to adopt the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. (The ACA
survived only because Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr., joined the four liberals
in holding that the law could be upheld
under Congress’s power to tax.)
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As Citizens United and McCutcheon
show, this libertarian strand of conservative ideology has also become one of the
most powerful currents in contemporary
First Amendment jurisprudence. A leading case is American Booksellers Ass’n v.
Hudnut (7th Cir. 1985), which struck
down a feminist anti-pornography ordinance. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook ruled
that the state may regulate sexually explicit material to protect traditional morality,
but not to promote gender equality—a
rationale that he condemned as a form of
authoritarian “thought control.” Likewise,
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), Justice Antonin Scalia treated a city’s ban on
cross-burning as an impermissible effort
to impose political correctness by punishing the expression of racist ideas. And
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000),
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist ruled
that the First Amendment right to freedom of association permitted the Scouts
to deny membership to gay persons on
moral grounds. In all of these cases—most
of which were decided by a vote of five to
four—conservative judges have used the
First Amendment to protect their conception of individual liberty against laws
that sought to promote social values like
dignity, equality, and community.

T

he conservative-libertarian approach
has made some valuable contributions to First Amendment jurisprudence.
For example, I believe that the conservative justices are right to hold in cases
like Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia (1995) that public
schools and universities may not discriminate against religious speakers, but must
grant them the same rights and benefits
that they afford to other speakers. The
libertarian outlook of the conservative
justices also may have helped to prevent
a recurrence after 9/11 of the official

The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence

suppression of radical speech that marred
American law during the Cold War era.
Yet I also believe that the conservative-libertarian approach to the First
Amendment has some serious flaws. The
first problem is that cases like Citizens
United and McCutcheon draw too close a
connection between free speech and property rights, and fail to recognize the ways
that unconstrained political spending and
contributions can distort and undermine
the democratic process. Second, decisions
like Hudnut and R.A.V. extend too much

as prisoners, public employees, and those
who serve in the military.

T

he root problem is that the conservative-libertarian approach is based
on an overly narrow and one-sided view
of the self—a view that stresses the ways
in which we are separate and independent
individuals, but that fails to adequately
recognize the social dimension of human
life. We need to develop an approach to
the First Amendment that is based on a
broader and richer conception of the self,

“We need to develop an approach to the First
Amendment that is based on a broader and richer
conception of the self, the society, and the nature
of constitutional freedom.”
protection to speech that injures, abuses, or degrades other people. Third, the
judges whom we are discussing tend to be
social conservatives as well as libertarians,
and deep problems arise when these two
aspects of conservative thought collide
with one another, as they have in recent
cases involving animal cruelty, violent
video games, and Internet pornography.
Fourth, by upholding traditional restrictions on expression, such as the obscenity
doctrine, while striking down regulations
that reflect liberal or progressive values,
the conservative-libertarian approach fails
to satisfy its own demand for ideological
neutrality. And finally, the conservative-libertarian commitment to protecting
free speech against the government focuses on individuals within the private sphere
and not on those within governmental institutions. As a result, the approach tends
to deny protection to those groups who
are most vulnerable to state control, such

the society, and the nature of constitutional freedom. I call this approach liberal humanism. Like conservative libertarianism,
this view stresses the value of liberty. But
it understands liberty not merely in negative terms—as freedom from government
intrusion or regulation—but also in more
positive terms, as the capacity to pursue
the full development and realization of
the self, through one’s own individual activities as well as through social relationships and participation in the community.
On this view, there is no inherent conflict
between the value of individual liberty
and social values such as dignity, equality,
and community. Instead, the law should
seek to reconcile all of these values with
one another.
Free speech has both an individual
and a social dimension: when individuals
communicate with one another, they not
only are engaging in self-expression but
also are participating in a form of social
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interaction. It follows that the right to free
speech carries with it a duty to respect the
personality of others and their status as
members of the community. For this reason, I would argue that the law should be
allowed to impose reasonable restrictions
on speech that injures, abuses, or degrades
other people, including some forms of
racist hate speech and violent pornography. Similarly, the right to free association
should not necessarily empower groups
that play a central role in the community,
such as the Boy Scouts, to exclude individuals on invidious grounds like sexual
orientation. Finally, the liberal-humanist
view conceives of political speech as democratic deliberation among free and equal
citizens, and thus would support some
restrictions on activity that undermines
our ability to engage in that process, such
as unlimited electoral spending by corporations and wealthy individuals. In this
way, we can reconcile First Amendment
freedoms with other values that are essen■
tial to a liberal democratic society. 
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